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in the German Dictatorships
1. Introduction
As is well known, two dictatorships arose and held sway in Germany in the years between 1933 and 1990. 
The fi rst was the National Socialist (hereinafter ‘NS’) ‘Third Reich’, which ended in 1945. The second was the 
German Democratic Republic (GDR) of 1945 or 1949*1 to 1990: With the end of World War II, Germany was 
divided into two states. While a parliamentary democracy (the Federal Republic of Germany) developed in 
the western one, the GDR arose in the eastern portion as a satellite state of the Soviet Union. In the end, in 
1990, the two German states were reunited (more precisely, the socialist GDR was integrated into the demo-
cratic Federal Republic). In this lecture*2 – which refers to my book Rechtswissenschaft in Diktaturen*3, 
published in June 2016 as a follow-up to my 2012 work on the history of legal methodology*4 – I would like 
to compare the legal methodology of the NS state and the GDR. Therefore, this discussion, as my German 
book does, contains a twofold comparison, looking backwards to the empire and the Weimar Republic and 
‘sideways’ from one dictatorship to the other. Especially in the fi eld of politics and history, comparisons of 
dictatorships are nothing new. To give an example, I would like to mention Hannah Arendt’s magnifi cent 
book The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951). Specifi c comparison of legal methods across diﬀ erent dictator-
ships nevertheless did not yet exist.
However, several objections might be raised against a comparison of the NS and GDR states. One might 
discuss whether both systems really were dictatorships. In the NS case, there are no doubts about that. The 
entire state was a single person, the ‘leader’ Adolf Hitler, who combined the supreme legislative, executive, 
and judicial powers in a single body. Things are more complicated with regard to the GDR. There did not 
exist a certain person acting as a dictator, only a particular outstanding party, the United Socialist Party 
(‘Sozialistische Einheitspartei’) of the GDR. However, there are no reasons not to classify it as a dictator. 
Firstly, it dominated the state by dint of holding all the power. That stemmed from the fact that government 
oﬃ  cials held crucial positions in the system while being party leaders at the same time. Furthermore, there 
was a constantly guaranteed parliamentary majority for that party as well. Secondly, in line with Marxist-
Leninist theory, the party was the ‘head’ of the ruling ‘working class’, as the arrangement was expressed in 
ɲ ɲɺɵɺ was the year of the fi rst GDR Constitution (‘Verfassung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik vom ɸ. Oktober 
ɲɺɵɺ’).
ɳ This article is based on a presentation made at the Autonomy of Law: Dictatorships Compared workshop in Tartu on ɲɶ Octo-
ber ɳɱɲɷ and edited by Marju Luts-Sootak, with support from the Estonian Research Council (grant IUTɳɱ-ɶɱ).
ɴ Jan Schröder. Rechtswissenschaft in Diktaturen. Die juristische Methodenlehre im NS-Staat und in der DDR. Munich ɳɱɲɷ.
ɵ Jan Schröder. Recht als Wissenschaft. Geschichte der juristischen Methodenlehre in der Neuzeit. ɳnd edition. Munich ɳɱɲɳ. 
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the Constitution of 1968*5. The Socialist Party embodied the state power*6; separation of powers defi nitely 
did not exist in the GDR. 
A completely diﬀ erent and heavily discussed question in Germany is whether the injustice of the Nazi 
era and the GDR government can really be ‘compared’ to each other. It can certainly be determined that 
the state crimes in the Nazi state had a dimension additional to those in the GDR. However, this is not the 
subject of my comparison. The task is not to evaluate crimes but to apply a scientifi c approach to concretely 
expressed real-world theories.
A second and very diﬃ  cult preliminary question rears its head too, however: to what extent can one 
ever compare certain fi gures of the legal methodology? Legal comparison does not mean comparing the 
concepts – i.e., looking for equal-sounding terms in certain systems that one would like to compare. Rather, 
one has to consider the function: which tools does a given legal system use to resolve a specifi c problem?*7 
Let us consider an example: the question of what powers legal representatives of minors hold in English law 
makes no sense. The answer would be this: ‘None, as there are no permanent legal representatives of a minor 
in English law.’ However, the problem that minors are not able to perform actions that are valid in terms of 
law is also known in English law. This would be the correct question: ‘Who can act for a minor in English 
law, and what powers are given to him?’ With regard to the comparison of methodological fi gures, there defi -
nitely exist similar pitfalls. However, I think that the problems are smaller in addressing two linguistically 
and historically related legal systems, such as those of the two German dictatorships. Therefore, I assume 
that linguistically equal methodological fi gures have not just the same expression but also the same function.
2. Concepts and sources of law
The concept of law found in the NS state and the GDR diﬀ ers in a signifi cant way from the preceding and 
the following periods. In the German Empire and the Weimar Republic, a voluntarist concept of law had 
prevailed. Law was the will of the community*8, expressed as statute in the constitutional procedure or 
otherwise as customary law. The law refl ected no particular ideology, or ‘Weltanschauung’; instead, it was 
open to diﬀ erent values. That aspect of law was quite diﬀ erent in the dictatorships. On one hand, the law 
was will, intent as well – in this case, the intent of the dictator (the ‘leader’ or the party). On the other hand, 
it should have specifi c contents that refl ect the oﬃ  cial ideology. In a contrast to ‘bourgeois theory’, there was 
not merely one principle, that of will, the intention of the legislator; there were two elements – the intent 
of the dictator and the oﬃ  cial ideology. This antinomy or contradiction between voluntaristic (authoritar-
ian in this case) and ideological principles is the key to the legal methodology of the German dictatorships.
That tension can be seen already in the concept of law and the sources of law. In the NS state, the law 
was defi ned as ‘ethnic order’, ‘order of life of the national community’, rooted in the ‘folkish sense of jus-
tice’, in the ‘racial soul’*9. This is an ideological defi nition. However, if we look to the law as statute, we fi nd 
an authoritarian defi nition, because the statute is called the ‘plan and will of the leader’*10 or simply the 
ɶ See ‘Verfassung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik vom ɷ. April ɲɺɷɹ in der Fassung des Gesetzes zur Ergänzung und 
Änderung der Verfassung der Deutsche Demokratischen Republik vom ɸ. Oktober ɲɺɸɵ’, whose Article I states: ‘Die Deutsche 
Demokratische Republik ist ein sozialistischer Staat deutscher Nation. Sie ist die politische Organisation der Werktätigen in 
Stadt und Land, die gemeinsam unter Führung der Arbeiterklasse und ihrer marxistisch-leninistischen Partei den Sozialismus 
verwirklichen.’
ɷ See, for example, Karl-Heinz Schöneburg, Richard Stüber. Führende Rolle der Arbeiterklasse und sozialistischer Staat. – 
Staat und Recht ɲɹ (ɲɺɷɺ), pp. ɷɷɷ–ɷɹɷ, especially ‘Die Partei ist die “Seele”, das “Zentrum”, der Kern der sozialistischen 
Staatsmacht’ (p. ɷɹɱ), and further quotations oﬀ ered by J. Schröder. Diktaturen (see Note ɴ), p. ɷɲ ﬀ . 
ɸ Konrad Zweigert, Hein Kötz. Einführung in die Rechtsvergleichung auf dem Gebiete des Privatrechts. ɴrd edition. Tübingen, 
Germany, ɲɺɺɷ, p. ɴɴ ﬀ .
ɹ See, for example, Karl Binding. Handbuch des Strafrechts, Vol. ɲ. Leipzig, Germany, ɲɹɹɶ, p. ɲɺɸ: ‘erklärter Gemeinwille’, 
and, still in the German Federal Republic, Ludwig Enneccerus, Hans Carl Nipperdey. Allgemeiner Teil des Bürgerlichen 
Rechts, ɲɶth Edition, Half-Vol. ɲ. Tübingen, Germany, ɲɺɶɺ, p. ɳɲɱ f.: ‘die auf dem Willen einer Gemeinschaft beruhende, 
unabhängig vom Willen des Einzelnen (ɳɲɲ) verbindliche Ordnung äußeren menschlichen Zusammenlebens durch Gebote 
und Gewährungen’. Further quotations are provided by J. Schröder. Recht (see Note ɵ), pp. ɳɹɲ–ɳɹɴ.
ɺ For example, Heinrich Lange. Nationalsozialismus und bürgerliches Recht. – Hans Frank (ed.). National sozialistisches 
Handbuch für Recht und Gesetzgebung. Munich ɲɺɴɶ, pp. ɺɴɴ–ɺɶɷ (ɺɴɶ): ‘Lebensordnung der Volksgemeinschaft’. Further 
quotations are provided by J. Schröder. Diktaturen (see Note ɴ), p. ɶ ﬀ .
ɲɱ Carl Schmitt. Die Rechtswissenschaft im Führerstaat. – Zeitschrift der Akademie für Deutsches Recht ɳ (ɲɺɴɶ), pp. ɵɴɴ–ɵɵɱ 
(ɵɴɺ). Further quotations are provided by J. Schröder (ibid.), pp. ɸ–ɺ.
Jan Schröder
Legal Methodology in the German Dictatorships
18 JURIDICA INTERNATIONAL 26/2017
‘leader’s order’ (Führerbefehl). Clearly, there is antinomy here. The order of the leader does not necessarily 
coincide with the real folkish sense of justice. The correspondence is created by the fi ction that the leader 
is the supreme interpreter of ethnic volition, ‘managing director of the people’s spirit’*11. The same tension 
or antinomy can be found in the GDR. In a system following Karl Marx, the law is the will of the ruling class 
(representing the voluntaristic element) while, on the other hand, it has a certain content, which is given 
by the ‘material conditions’ of the class (expressing the ideological element)*12. The material base (‘Basis’) 
determines the legal superstructure (‘Überbau’). In real socialism, the voluntaristic element is the will 
of the working class, ultimately their party, and the ideological element arises no longer from the material 
base (Basis), which may have to be formed via revolutionary means by the superstructure (Überbau) – see 
Stalin*13 – but from the socialist ‘objective laws of development’ of the society. This is how, in one example, 
Leipzig’s Professor Traute Schönrath defi ned the socialist law in 1962*14: it is ‘the uniform will formed by 
the working class and its allies on the basis of the decisions of the party by means of the socialist state’ – that 
is, the authoritarian element – ‘to realise the objective laws of the given stage consciously’ in the substan-
tive, ideological element. Here antinomy arises again: it may be that the will of the party and the ‘objective 
laws’ do not coincide. But, again, they assist with a fi ction – namely, that the party always scientifi cally 
recognises the objective social laws and the necessary conclusions*15.
Having understood this interaction or contradiction between the authoritarian and the ideological prin-
ciple, one can discern its eﬀ ects in the legal methodology anywhere. With regard to the doctrine of legal 
sources, it was the authoritarian principle that dominated in both dictatorships. I will mention only three 
particularly striking correspondences.
2.1. Customary law 
Before 1933, German lawyers had recognised a customary law. At least according to the private-law litera-
ture, it did not require any approval by the legislator and could even abolish (derogate from) statutory law, 
in line with the lex posterior derogat legi priori principle*16.
In the Nazi state and the GDR, all of that no longer applied. Indeed, the Nazi jurists seem at fi rst glance 
to have held customary law in high esteem. According to the ‘folkish’ legal theory, the people are creator 
of the law while the state, as it has been put, is ‘only a midwife, not the mother’*17. But if we look more 
closely, a diﬀ erent picture emerges. No Nazi jurist believed that a customary law could override statutory 
law*18. The will of the leadership always was given priority. The dominance of law expressed as statutes is 
even more evident in the GDR context*19. For the most part, the jurists spoke not of customary law but of 
customs. There are reasons for this point of view. In the European legal tradition, customary law requires 
not only constant exercise but also legal conviction on the part of the people. However, such autonomous 
legal conviction could not exist under socialism. A ‘legal consciousness’ (Rechtsbewußtsein) does not arise 
spontaneously in people; it develops only in the ‘conscious part of the proletariat’ – i.e., in the party*20. Only 
the party carries the ‘scientifi cally’ developed legal consciousness to the working class and to the people. 
ɲɲ Walter Schönfeld. Zur geschichtlichen und weltanschaulichen Grundlegung des Rechts. – Deutsche Rechtswissenschaft ɵ 
(ɲɺɴɺ), pp. ɳɱɲ–ɳɳɲ (ɳɲɶ).
ɲɳ Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels. Manifest der kommunistischen Partei (ɲɹɵɹ). Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels. Werke. Berlin 
ɲɺɶɷ–ɲɺɺɱ, ɵ, pp. ɵɷɳ–ɵɺɳ (ɵɸɸ): ‘... wie euer Recht nur der zum Gesetz erhobene Wille eurer Klasse ist, ein Wille, dessen 
Inhalt gegeben ist, in den materiellen Lebensbedingungen eurer Klasse’.
ɲɴ Josef Stalin. Marxismus und Fragen der Sprachwissenschaft (ɲɺɶɱ) (edited by H.P. Gente). Munich ɲɺɷɹ, p. ɳɲ ﬀ . (ɳɵ). 
ɲɵ Traute Schönrath. Das sozialistische Recht - Instrument des einheitlichen bewußten Handelns der Gesellschaft unter Füh-
rung der Partei der Arbeiterklasse. – Staat und Recht ɲɲ (ɲɺɷɳ), pp. ɲɸɸɷ–ɲɸɸɺ (ɲɸɸɸ). Further defi nitions are provided 
by J. Schröder. Diktaturen (see Note ɴ), p. ɷɸ.
ɲɶ Institut für Theorie des Staates und des Rechts der Akademie der Wissenschaften der DDR (eds). Marxistisch-leninistische 
Staats- und Rechtstheorie. Lehrbuch. ɴrd edition. Berlin ɲɺɹɱ, p. ɶɱɳ: The decisions of the party are ‘Ausdruck höchster 
Bewußtheit und Wissenschaftlichkeit’. See also J. Schröder (ibid.), p. ɷɹ f. 
ɲɷ See J. Schröder. Recht (see Note ɵ), p. ɳɺɸ ﬀ . 
ɲɸ J. von Staudinger. Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch und dem Einführungsgesetze, Vol. I: ‘Allgemeiner Teil’, ɲɱth 
edition. Munich, Berlin, & Leipzig, Germany, ɲɺɴɷ, specifi cally, the introduction’s Section VI, no. ɵɷ, p. ɳɷ. 
ɲɹ See J. Schröder. Diktaturen (see Note ɴ), p. ɲɱ f. 
ɲɺ The following is according to J. Schröder (ibid.), pp. ɸɲ–ɸɴ.
ɳɱ Staats- und Rechtstheorie (see Note ɲɶ), p. ɵɷɹ.
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Therefore, customary law has no chance of evolving in socialism. The party and the leaders of the state can 
‘sanction’ a form of constant exercise and elevate it to the status of statutory law*21; however, autonomous 
customary law does not exist.
2.2. Judicial review of statutes (the court’s right of inspection)
Jurists in the Weimar Republic had claimed that a court may examine whether a statute corresponds to the 
Constitution or not. The Supreme Court (Reichsgericht) often exercised this right. However, in the legal 
literature, this issue remained controversial until the end of the Weimar Republic*22. 
In both German dictatorships, a judicial right of inspection of statutes nevertheless was strictly rejected. 
In the Nazi state, the Weimar Constitution was held to be no longer valid. Unless particular norms were 
still in place, they certainly had no priority over ordinary statutes. But even apart from that, the Nazi jurists 
vehemently denied a power of intervention by judges in the statutes of the leaders: ‘The leader can interpret 
the folkish legal conviction better than the judge.’*23 In the GDR, the same fi gure can be seen*24. Lenin had 
characterised the judge’s judicial review as a typical manifestation of a bourgeois society of exploitation. 
The bourgeoisie wanted to eliminate legality in order to serve the interests of monopoly capitalism more 
easily. Only the parliament of the GDR (‘Volkskammer’), dominated by the party, could decide whether a 
given statute violated the Constitution*25; that action could not legitimately be performed by a court, not 
even the highest of courts.
2.3. Judge-made law? 
Since about 1900, German lawyers had maintained the conclusion that there are gaps in the law that cannot 
be fi lled by the legal system itself (by analogy). The result is a theory of judge-made law. Hence, the judge 
should close the gaps by free decision, even on the basis of his own personal value judgements (‘Eigenwer-
tung’). Hence, the judge’s decision is regarded as a source of law in the individual case at issue. Whether it 
also has the eﬀ ect of a prejudice remains controversial indeed, but in any case the decision can grow into 
customary law and thereby become a source of law*26.
The lawyers in the German dictatorships did not follow this theory of judge-made law. Accordingly, in 
the NS state, the term ‘judge-made law’ was seen very rarely. The lawyers especially rejected the idea that 
a judge could enforce his own value preferences. As far as he ever can decide freely, his decision should be 
based on Nazi ideology*27. A much more in-depth discussion developed in the GDR*28, but there too the 
lawyers did not accept ‘case law’. Only in the fi nal years of that dictatorship, 1985–1990, did the idea arise 
that the judicial decision issued is at least a source of law for the relevant individual case*29. Just as strongly 
as in the NS state, personal evaluation by the judge was rejected. Again, if the judge is free to decide, then he 
should do so on the basis of the socialist ideology and not through his personal sense of justice*30. In addi-
ɳɲ Ibid., p. ɵɱɶ f. 
ɳɳ See Christoph Gusy. Richterliches Prüfungsrecht. Eine verfassungsgeschichtliche Untersuchung. Berlin ɲɺɹɶ; J. Schröder. 
Recht (see Note ɵ), p. ɴɳɳ ﬀ . 
ɳɴ Hans Franzen. Gesetz und Richter. Hamburg, Germany, ɲɺɴɶ, p. ɳɸ ﬀ . See also J. Schröder. Diktaturen (see Note ɴ), p. ɲɴ ﬀ . 
ɳɵ For example, Staatsrecht der DDR, a textbook edited by Akademie für Staats- und Rechtswissenschaft der DDR. Berlin 
ɲɺɸɸ, pp. ɴɴɷ, ɴɹɲ. Further quotations are provided by J. Schröder (ibid.), p. ɸɹ. 
ɳɶ DDR-Verfassung ɲɺɷɹ, Art. ɹɺ III ɳ.
ɳɷ Cf. J. Schröder. Recht (see Note ɵ), pp. ɴɱɶ ﬀ ., ɴɸɷ ﬀ .
ɳɸ Georg Dahm et al. Leitsätze über Stellung und Aufgaben des Richters. – Deutsche Rechtswissenschaft ɲ (ɲɺɴɷ) p. ɲɳɴ ﬀ . (ɲɳɴ): 
‘Es ist nicht seine [sc. the judge’s] Aufgabe, einer über der Volksgemeinschaft stehenden Rechtsordnung zur Anwendung zu 
verhelfen oder “allgemeine Wertvorstellungen” durchsetzen; vielmehr hat er die konkrete völkische Gemeinschaftsordnung 
zu wahren.’ Cf. J. Schröder. Diktaturen (see Note ɴ), pp. ɲɲ, ɴɷ ﬀ .
ɳɹ See J. Schröder (ibid.), pp. ɸɴ–ɸɷ, ɺɹ.
ɳɺ For example, Detlef Joseph. Buchbesprechung. – Staat und Recht ɴɶ (ɲɺɹɷ), pp. ɶɱɹ–ɶɲɱ, specifi cally p. ɶɲɱ.
ɴɱ The judge had to decide parteilich – in accordance with socialist ideology: Günther Lehmann, Hans Weber. Theoretische 
Grundfragen der sozialistischen Rechtspfl ege. – Neue Justiz ɲɺɷɺ, pp. ɷɱɷ–ɷɲɶ (ɷɱɹ): ‘Die Parteilichkeit ist Grundlage und 
Garantie der richterlichen Unabhängigkeit, weil sie dem Richter die Möglichkeit gibt, auf der Basis der objektiven Gesetz-
mäßigkeiten und der revolutionären Praxis zu entscheiden und ihn vor Spontaneität und damit vor Willkür und Ungesetz-
lichkeit bewahrt.’
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tion, judgements can never evolve to become customary law, because – as we have seen – an autonomous 
customary law did not exist in East Germany. Only the legislator could elevate a permanent judicial practice 
to statutory law.
In summary, we can see striking similarities between the dictatorial theories and, at the same time, sig-
nifi cant diﬀ erences from ‘bourgeois theory’. In dictatorships, the authoritarian principle is quite prevalent. 
The dictator (whether ‘leader’ or party) holds a legislative monopoly that is strictly maintained. The ideo-
logical principle is not required here. Yet its implementation will not be harmed, according to the fi ction 
that the dictator always recognises the ideologically correct solution, either through visionary talent (such 
as that of the NS ‘leader’) or by application of ‘scientifi c’ insight (as with that of the party). Only in situations 
wherein the dictator is unable to act himself (e.g., in the judicial realm) does the ideological principle play 
a certain role.
3. Interpretation of the law
3.1. The purpose of interpretation of the law
For this reason, the ideological principle gains much greater importance in the interpretation of the law. To 
discuss this, I shall start again with a review of the German Empire and the Weimar Republic. Interpreta-
tion theory before 1933 had an ideologically neutral alignment relative to either the intention of the legisla-
tor (subjective-historical theory) or the occasion’s prevailing values (objective theory)*31. This controversy 
between objective and subjective theory continued in the dictatorships as tension between the authoritar-
ian principle, following the will of the dictator, and the ideological principle, applying the oﬃ  cial ideology. 
However clear the divide was before 1933, it was ultimately dissolved in the dictatorships through elevation 
of the ideological principle.
National Socialism
In National Socialism, there was swift ascendancy of the principle that laws should be interpreted in accor-
dance with the ‘National Socialist ideology’*32. The opposing ‘subjective-historical’ theory (in the dictator-
ships, the authoritarian principle) had only a few followers*33. At fi rst glance, this is surprising: why was 
the will of the dictator unimportant? One reason is that the NS state was tied up not only with Nazi statutes 
but also with numerous old norms, which remained valid, such as those enshrined in the German civil code 
(BGB) and the Criminal Code (StGB). Here, no will of the dictator was evident if he had not commented on 
the old law, and the intention of the old legislator did not need to be honoured. The Nazis were interested 
particularly in interpreting the old statutes in light of their own ideology. The other reason is that even 
Nazi laws could become obsolete or were formulated defi ciently. Also, there was an interest in adapting the 
National Socialist ideology in this case if it was not clearly in opposition to the will of the dictator.
Some examples may be illustrative:
1)  Before 1933, German tax law accorded a privileged position to services and institutions that were 
‘of public utility’ or ‘charitable’ in nature. From that year forward, however, the courts denied such 
tax benefi ts when they could be applied in favour of Jewish taxpayers. The tax law came to be 
interpreted restrictively. Hence, expenses for Jewish sports clubs and children’s sanatoriums were 
no longer ‘of public utility’ or ‘charitable’, because they were preferential to ‘foreign race nationals’ 
ɴɲ See J. Schröder. Recht (see Note ɵ), p. ɴɵɶ ﬀ . 
ɴɳ Steueranpassungsgesetz (ɲɷ October ɲɺɴɵ), Section ɲ, ‘Die Steuergesetze sind nach nationalsozialistischer Weltanschauung 
auszulegen’. This was regarded as a principle valid for the interpretation of any law. See, for example, Sächsisches Ober-
verwaltungsgericht. – Juristische Wochenschrift ɲɺɴɶ, p. ɹɹɷ (‘allgemeiner Rechtsgrundsatz’); Georg Dahm et al. Leitsätze 
(see Note ɳɸ), p. ɲɳɴ (‘Grundlage der Auslegung aller Rechtsquellen ist die nationalsozialistische Weltanschauung’). See 
Bernd Rüthers. Die unbegrenzte Auslegung. Zum Wandel der Privatrechtsordnung im Nationalsozialismus. ɸth edition 
(ɲɺɷɹ). Tübingen, Germany, ɳɱɲɳ, p. ɲɹɴ ﬀ .; Bernd Mertens. Rechtsetzung im Nationalsozialismus. Tübingen, Germany, 
ɳɱɱɺ, pp. ɺɷ, ɲɱɵ ﬀ .; J. Schröder. Diktaturen (see Note ɴ), p. ɲɹ ﬀ .
ɴɴ Chief among these was Philipp Heck. Rechtserneuerung und juristische Methodenlehre. Tübingen, Germany, ɲɺɴɷ. Cf. 
J. Schröder (ibid.), p. ɴɱ ﬀ . 
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and not the German national community*34. The racial ideology of the Nazi regime here leads to an 
ideologically based interpretation of the law, which has nothing to do with the original intention of 
the legislator.
2)  In consequence of the Reichstag Fire Decree of 28 February 1933, the Gestapo could impose so-
called protective custody (Schutzhaft) ‘to repel Communist seditious violence’. The Nazi courts 
extended this rule such that it applied not only to Communists but in respect of any other persons 
whom the state somehow deemed undesired*35. After this, attacks by said parties were interpreted 
as ‘communist in the broadest sense’, in the words of the Berlin Regional Court (Landgericht)*36.
3)  Passed on 14 July 1933, the Law for the Prevention of Genetically Diseased Oﬀ spring allowed 
the sterilisation of alcoholics and certain other persons with a hereditary defect. This statute 
was extended by the courts in favour of the so-called eugenic health of the German people: if a 
woman with a hereditary illness was pregnant, not only sterilisation but also abortion could now be 
 performed*37. In 1935, the Nazis issued a corresponding statute*38.
The GDR
In an analogous manner, the jurists of the GDR interpreted the law in accordance with the ideology and not 
with reference to the historical intention of the legislator. It was stated that the interpretation should be ‘par-
tially’ socialist*39, and sometimes scholars opined that the will of the legislator is likewise relevant. However, 
that will was not conceived of in a historical sense; instead, the framework was to be ‘dialectical’ in the sense 
of the development of the law and society. This has to be regarded as ‘evolutionary’, not ‘static’*40. Therefore, 
the actual intention of the legislature is irrelevant; there is only an ideological and ‘partial’ interpretation. So, 
while in the NS state a minority still preferred the subjective-historical interpretation, it disappeared com-
pletely in the GDR. There is free rein in interpretation on the basis of the current ideological requirements.
Again, I shall oﬀ er a few examples:
1)  The German Civil Code of 1896 remained valid in the GDR until 1975. Its Section 932 contains terms 
for bona fi de acquisition of movables. The acquirer becomes the owner if he believes the seller’s 
ownership to be valid. Only stolen or lost things are exempted. What is to be done under socialism, 
however, when a state-owned (volkseigen) thing is at issue? The GDR’s lawyers refused to apply the 
BGB in this case. It was impossible for a private citizen to acquire a state-owned movable in good 
faith. Thus §932 became restricted: it could not apply to public property. Otherwise, the ‘planned 
development of our economy’ could be disturbed, according to the Supreme Court of the GDR*41.
2)  In cases of renting out fl ats, the courts protected the tenant against the (generally private) owner, 
because the tenant was supposed to be the socially weaker party. According to the Civil Code’s 
Section 112, Chapter III, the tenant has to be compensated at the end of the term of rental for any 
improvements made to the fl at. However, the courts went further, extending this rule: if the fl at is 
defective, the tenant may demand compensation earlier*42.
ɴɵ Reichsfi nanzhof (ɸ. Januar ɲɺɴɷ). – Juristische Wochenschrift ɲɺɴɷ, pp. ɳɳɷɵ–ɳɳɷɷ (ɳɳɷɶ); Reichsfi nanzhof (ɲɱ. Dezember 
ɲɺɴɷ). – Juristische Wochenschrift ɲɺɴɸ, p. ɳɸɷ.
ɴɶ See Gerhard Werle. Justiz-Strafrecht und politische Verbrechensbekämpfung im Dritten Reich. Berlin etc. ɲɺɹɺ, p. ɷɷ ﬀ .; 
Lothar Gruchmann. Justiz im Dritten Reich. Anpassung und Unterwerfung in der Ära Gürtner. ɴrd edition. Munich ɳɱɱɲ, 
p. ɶɴɶ ﬀ .
ɴɷ Following L. Gruchmann (ibid.), p. ɶɵɱ.
ɴɸ Erbgesundheitsgericht Hamburg (ɲɷ. März ɲɺɴɵ). – Juristische Wochenschrift ɲɺɴɶ, pp. ɳɲɶ–ɳɲɹ (ɳɲɸ); Erbgesundheits-
obergericht Bamberg (ɳɲ. Dezember ɲɺɴɵ). – Juristische Wochenschrift ɲɺɴɶ, p. ɲɵɳɸ. 
ɴɹ Änderungsgesetz zum Erbgesundheitsgesetz, ɳɷ June ɲɺɴɶ, Section ɲɱ a. 
ɴɺ Staats- und Rechtstheorie (see Note ɲɶ), p. ɶɹɱ; Hilde Benjamin. Neue Justiz ɲɺɶɹ, p. ɵɴɸ: ‘dialektische Einheit von strikter 
Einhaltung der Gesetze und Parteilichkeit ihrer Anwendung’. More quotations are provided by J. Schröder. Diktaturen (see 
Note ɴ), p. ɹɳ ff.
ɵɱ Imre Szabó. Die theoretischen Fragen der Auslegung der Rechtsnorm. (East) Berlin ɲɺɷɴ, p. ɺ ﬀ .
ɵɲ Oberstes Gericht der DDR (ɹ. Oktober ɲɺɶɸ). – Neue Justiz ɲɺɶɸ, pp. ɸɸɷ–ɸɸɹ (ɸɸɸ). In the modern literature, this deci-
sion is commented on by, for example, Hans-Peter Haferkamp. Begründungsverhalten des Reichsgerichts zwischen ɲɺɴɴ 
und ɲɺɵɶ in Zivilsachen verglichen mit Entscheidungen des obersten Gerichts der DDR vor ɲɺɶɹ. – Rainer Schröder (ed.). 
Zivilrechtskultur der DDR, Vol. ɳ. Berlin ɳɱɱɱ, pp. ɲɶ–ɶɱ (especially p. ɵɷ ﬀ .); J. Schröder. Diktaturen (see Note ɴ), p. ɺɳ ﬀ . 
ɵɳ Bezirksgericht Leipzig (ɲɲ. Mai ɲɺɸɹ). – Neue Justiz ɲɺɸɹ, p. ɶɱɷ f.; Oberstes Gericht der DDR (ɲɲ. Mai ɲɺɸɺ). – Neue 
Justiz ɲɺɸɺ, p. ɴɸɵ ﬀ . 
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3)  A Supreme Court decision on the law applying to an agricultural-production co-operative (Land-
wirtschaftliche Produktionsgenossenschaft, or LPG) has become well known. The LPGs repre-
sented compulsory forced association of farmers. They became agricultural collectives. Under the 
provisions of the relevant statute, a member could leave the collective before the end of the harvest 
only if the General Assembly agreed to this. However, according to the Supreme Court, the General 
Assembly could also contest exit after the harvest is complete. In general, a member could leave 
the co-operative for ‘socially justifi able reasons’ only*43. That is – again for ideological reasons – 
almost an interpretation contra legem.
3.2. The tools of statutory interpretation
I cannot go into detail here on the complex doctrine on tools or ‘elements’ of interpretation, which has 
been in constant fl ux over the centuries. I just want to point to one signifi cant divergence of the dicta-
torial theory from the preceding ‘bourgeois theory’. The ‘bourgeois’ voluntarist legal theory in 1900 par-
ticularly stressed the purpose of the legislator*44. Going a step further, Philipp Heck developed the notion 
of the ‘jurisprudence of interests’, which involved enquiry into the interests that formed the basis for a 
statute and evaluation of them*45. These are questions of a relativistic theory of law, which, rather than 
recognise absolute and immutable values, purposes, and interests, assumes pluralism and the constant 
change of purposes and interests. And, of course, these interests are not only those of the society but also of 
the individual.
Things were completely diﬀ erent in the dictatorships. Hardly a word was so hated there as ‘pluralism’. 
There was no majority of relevant interests, only one – either, in the NS state, the ‘folkish’ or, in the GDR, 
a socialist interest. Of course, that is a collective interest, not an individual-level one. The Nazi lawyers 
launched a violent attack on the jurisprudence of interests as espousing relativism and positivism*46. In the 
GDR, jurists declared that under socialism there can be no confl ict of interests, because the ‘antagonistic 
contradiction between the interests of the individual and the interests of society’ had been ‘overcome’*47. 
What benefi ts society also benefi ts the individual. I return to an example from earlier: if a private citizen 
cannot acquire public property in good faith, that still benefi ts him, ‘because the protection of public prop-
erty always serves the interests of single citizens too’*48. Hence, the jurisprudence of interests should not be 
developed further but negated*49. The diﬀ erent and changing purposes and interests are not tools of inter-
pretation. Herein, the interpretation theories of the German dictatorships correspond to each other, while 
diﬀ ering from those in ‘bourgeois theory’.
3.3. Gaps and their fi lling
Allow me to make a few comments about the gaps. One problem is the very concept of a gap. The lawyers 
of the early 20th century had recognised that ascertaining the existence of a ‘gap’ is a value judgement. 
That is a discovery largely due to Ernst Zitelmann (1903)*50. For example, the German Criminal Code of 
1871 punished only the theft of physical objects. Is there a gap demonstrated by not punishing the theft of 
electrical energy? A gap in the sense that a judge cannot make a decision does not exist. He could also argue 
e contrario and acquit the electricity thief. A gap exists only if we judge this kind of ‘theft’ to be punishable. 
ɵɴ Oberstes Gericht der DDR (ɲɴ. August ɲɺɷɴ). – Neue Justiz ɲɺɷɴ, pp. ɶɸɲ–ɶɸɶ (ɶɸɵ).
ɵɵ See J. Schröder. Recht (see Note ɵ), p. ɴɷɶ ﬀ . 
ɵɶ See Jan Schröder. Interessenjurisprudenz. – Albrecht Cordes et al. (eds). Handwörterbuch zur deutschen Rechtsgeschichte. 
ɳnd edition, Vol. II. Berlin ɳɱɲɳ, cols ɲɳɷɸ–ɲɳɷɺ.
ɵɷ For example, Karl Larenz. Über Gegenstand und Methode des völkischen Rechtsdenkens. Berlin ɲɺɴɹ, p. ɴɸ; Roland Freisler. 
Nationalsozialistisches Recht und Rechtsdenken. Berlin ɲɺɴɹ, p. ɵɱ. Modern analysis is provided by B. Rüthers. Unbegrenzte 
Auslegung (see Note ɴɳ), p. ɳɸɱ ﬀ .
ɵɸ Gerhard Haney, Helmut Oberländer. Sozialistische Staatlichkeit ohne Rechtsbewußtsein? – Staat und Recht ɲɺ (ɲɺɸɱ), 
pp. ɹɱ–ɺɴ (ɺɲ).
ɵɹ Oberstes Gericht (see Note ɵɲ), p. ɸɸɸ ﬀ . 
ɵɺ Karl-Heinz Schöneburg. Staats- und Rechtstheorie der Arbeiterklasse in der antifaschistisch -demokratischen Umwälzung 
ɲɺɵɶ bis ɲɺɵɺ. – Staat und Recht ɳɹ (ɲɺɸɺ), pp. ɹɲɵ–ɹɳɶ (ɹɳɳ).
ɶɱ Ernst Zitelmann. Lücken im Recht. Leipzig, Germany, ɲɺɱɴ.
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This is not self-evident but, as noted above, a value judgement. What are its foundations? That is controver-
sial under the ‘bourgeois’ legal theory: According to the subjective and historical interpretation theory, this 
depends on the intention of the legislator. According to the objective theory, it depends on the social values 
prevailing at the time*51.
In the German dictatorships, one can see the same principles as in the theory of the tools of interpre-
tation. The subjective-historical point of view does not matter; only the current values are relevant. This 
is, again, in line with the oﬃ  cial ideology. The NS ideology assumes the presence of a gap if ‘the folkish 
consciousness is requiring a norm that is not contained in the statute’*52. According to the GDR lawyers, a 
gap exists when rules are missing that ‘are absolutely necessary for the development of social relations’*53. 
While in the ‘bourgeois’ conception the gap is found to exist on the basis of the plan of the legislator or the 
current values, in the NS state it arises in light of the nationalist ideology and in socialism in connection 
with the needs of the socialist society.
The corresponding ‘bourgeois’ view on fi lling in the gaps was that they should be addressed either by 
analogy or via creative judgement. These two methods came to be discussed in the dictatorships too, but 
with diﬀ erent emphasis. Although analogy was indeed recognised as necessary, suspicion was maintained 
in connection with it. The judge’s decision should be, as we already have seen, based not on the judge’s own 
values but only on the oﬃ  cial ideology of the dictatorship*54.
One could say the following in summary: The two dictatorships show a clear diﬀ erence from ‘bourgeois 
theory’: There is no ‘subjective-historical’ interpretation, or at least its supporters were (as in the NS con-
text) quite clearly in the minority. The dictatorships were in mutual agreement that the interpretation has 
to realise the current values and that these stem from the oﬃ  cial ideology. The ideological principle was 
dominant, while the authoritarian principle’s infl uence was negligible.
4. Jurisprudence
‘Jurisprudence’ refers here to the doctrine of the applicable law, the conceptual and systematic treatment of 
legal material. In Germany, we call it ‘Rechtsdogmatik’ (legal doctrine) in a contrast to philosophy of law, 
history of law, sociology of law, etc. Little interest in this dogmatic processing of the law was expressed in 
the dictatorships. Especially in the GDR, there were demands that the current law not be handled in its own 
right and be dealt with only in its relationship to the social basis*55. Nevertheless, not only in the NS state 
but also in the GDR there were statements on conceptual and systematic workings. Again, these resemble 
each other and diverge from ‘bourgeois theory’ signifi cantly.
Considering the conceptualisation, we can, following Ernst Cassirer*56, distinguish between substan-
tial and functional ones. With the former, one asks about the essence of an object, while the functional is an 
attempt to conceive of law only in relation to its specifi c purpose. German jurisprudence has long dealt with 
both substantial and essential concepts, particularly in the natural-law theory of the early modern period 
and then in the scholarship of the historical school of law. But voluntaristic theory after 1900 abandoned 
the essential-class concepts. The specifi c purpose of a norm was deemed crucial for its correct understand-
ing, and the concepts were seen as having to be formed in accordance therewith. The jurists of the day no 
longer believed that one essence obtains at all times. Even if there were such an essence, it was not deemed 
to play a role for conceptualisation purposes. In contrast, only the functional context was decisive. An exam-
ple can be seen with the concept of causality. The substantial or essential concept might stress each sine qua 
non as the cause. This term, however, was found to be overly broad in the civil-law context, so jurists limited 
ɶɲ Cf. J. Schröder. Recht (see Note ɵ), p. ɴɹɱ ﬀ . 
ɶɳ K. Larenz. Gegenstand (see Note ɵɷ), p. ɲɷ. See also Heinz Hildebrandt. Rechtsfi ndung im neuen deutschen Staate. Berlin 
& Leipzig, Germany, ɲɺɴɶ, p. ɸɷ.
ɶɴ Gregor Gysi. Zur Vervollkommnung des sozialistischen Rechts im Rechtsverwirklichungsprozeß (doctoral dissertation 
(A). Humboldt-Universität Berlin ɲɺɸɶ, p. ɺɺ ﬀ .; W.W. Lasarew. Die Lücken im Recht und die Wege zu ihrer Beseitigung 
(in Russian). Moscow ɲɺɸɵ, p. ɸ (cited by Gysi, on p. ɲɱɱ).
ɶɵ Cf. J. Schröder. Diktaturen (see Note ɴ), pp. ɴɴ–ɴɶ, ɺɶ–ɺɸ (on analogy), and pp. ɴɶ–ɴɸ, ɺɸ ﬀ . (on the judge’s judgement).
ɶɶ Cf. J. Schröder (ibid.), pp. ɲɱɲ–ɲɱɵ.
ɶɷ Ernst Cassirer. Substanzbegriﬀ  und Funktionsbegriﬀ . Untersuchungen über die Grundfragen der Erkenntniskritik. Berlin 
ɲɺɲɱ.
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it in accordance with the functions of civil liability in line with so-called adequate causation*57. The lawyers 
in the dictatorships, in turn, rejected such a purely functional or relativistic conceptualisation*58. Both in 
the NS*59 and in the GDR*60, it was necessary to form concepts in accordance with the nature or essence of 
the object. Rooted in their ideology, a belief was held in the dictatorships that they could be secure in their 
knowledge, which laid bare to them the essence, the substance of a concept. It is instructive yet again how 
the concept of causality was applied. Unlike ‘bourgeois theory’, Marxist-Leninist theory included an asser-
tion that there is only one correct concept of causality, that held by Karl Marx. For him, causality was ‘the 
direct connection between two processes’ only*61. The lawyers in the GDR soon came to perceive that this 
concept of direct causality was not suitable in practice. They had to approve an indirect causality, a causal 
chain, too*62. Nevertheless, they stuck with the Marxist concept, simply changing it ‘dialectically’ for the 
specifi c case dealt with*63. Thus the conceptualisation is determined by the ideological principle entirely.
An almost insurmountable problem in the dictatorships was the system formation. The traditional 
systems of jurisprudence are identifi ed as axiomatic and classifi catory systems. The axiomatic ones pre-
suppose a law that can be derived from a few fundamental principles. Natural lawyers took such systems 
to be possible. After the 19th century, however, German jurists not longer sought an axiomatic system of 
law. A classifi catory system, in contrast, is less demanding; it requires only the ever further subdivision of 
a central concept into narrower terms, such as the division of law into public and private law and so forth. 
Such systems can be found even in the ‘bourgeois’ jurisprudence of the 20th century. However, to create 
such systems, one needs relatively formal, general concepts. Those were roundly rejected in the dictatorial 
ideologies. It is my opinion that this is why all attempts to create systems in the dictatorships ultimately 
failed. They all were disorganised and merely reordered, piece by piece, what had existed in the legal fi elds 
already covered. For example, the groupings in the NS state were the following: party, state, family, farm, 
labour*64. In the GDR, the areas of law were constitutional law, administrative law, fi nancial law, land law, 
civil law, etc.*65 In these ‘systems’, one can see already that the fi rst requirement for a true system is not met. 
Namely, they are missing an independent organising principle. The system formation – at least according 
to traditional standards – probably failed because of the ideological setting.
I hope to have shown that, on one hand, the methodological statements made are similar between the two 
German dictatorships and that, secondly, they deviate considerably from those of ‘bourgeois’ legal theory. 
Accordingly, this discussion has revealed a clear profi le of a dictatorial-ideological method characteristic of 
the German dictatorships of the 20th century. I have to leave unanswered the question of whether this is 
found also in other dictatorships.
ɶɸ See J. Schröder. Recht (see Note ɵ), pp. ɵɱɴ–ɵɱɷ (ɵɱɴ ﬀ .).
ɶɹ See J. Schröder. Diktaturen (see Note ɴ), pp. ɵɶ ﬀ ., ɲɱɵ ﬀ .
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